St. John's Law Review
Volume 18
Number 2 Volume 18, April 1944, Number 2

Article 12

Negotiable Instruments--Action Against Accommodation Party-Promise Not to Enforce the Instrument (Callery v. Lyons, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 2, 1944, p. 431, col. 1, not officially reported))
St. John's Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Recent Development in New York Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of
St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

1944 ]

RECENT DECISIONS

reasonable even though the specified period is shorter than the statutory term of limitation of the state.11 In the event there is no contractual provision, the statutes of limitation of the states govern the
action. In a suit by the carrier to collect an undercharge in express
rates on interstate shipments, a defense was the prescription of two
years under the Louisiana statute, but it was held that the three-year
federal statute applied.1 2 In an action by a carrier to recover an
excessive refund, the action was held to be one on implied contract
to refund money and not barred by the statute.' 3
A. J. D.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-AcTION'AGAINST ACCOMMODATION

action
brought by the payees against an indorser of a promissory note (the
end note of a series of renewals), the indorser set up the specific
defense that the indorsement was without consideration and for the
accommodation of the payees upon the understanding that he would
not be liable to them. Defendant testified that when the maker asked
him to indorse the original note, defendant, before doing so, called
the payees and asked them why the indorsement was wanted; that
payees replied they intended to discount the note and needed another
name because they were "afraid the bank wouldn't take it" with the
only indorsement it then bore, that of the maker's wife; that there
was an agreement that as between defendant and payees, defendant
would not be liable; that with this agreement in mind he signed the
renewal notes; and that at no time had he received any consideration. The note had been discounted by the bank and the proceeds
credited to the payees' account. At maturity it had not been paid,
but renewed, and further renewals had thereafter been made, the
defendant indorsing the note on each occasion. The end note had
been protested and charged into the account of the payees, who thereupon brought the action. The jury returned a verdict favorable to
the defendant, upon which verdict judgment was entered dismissing
the complaint. The Appellate Division of the Third Judicial Department, by a non-unanimous order,' reversed the judgment of the Trial
Term upon the law 2 and the facts, holding that denial of plaintiffs'
motion for a directed verdict was error, inasmuch as there was no
PARTY-PROMISE NOT To ENFORCE THE INSTRUENT.-In an

"IAdams v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 124 Cal. 393, 12 P. (2d) 464
(1932) ; Provident Fund Society v. Howell, 110 Ala. 508, 18 So. 311 (1895).
Contra: Aetna Casualty Co. v. U. S. Gypsum"Co., 239 Ky. 247, 39 S. W. (2d)

234 (1931).
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Strawberry Growers' Selling Co. v. American Railway Express, 31 F.

(2d) 947, 83 A. L. R. 246 (1929).
13 T. M. Partridge Lumber Co.
(1928).

v. Michigan Central R. R., 26 F. (2d) 615

1Callery v. Lyons, 265 App. Div. 604, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 191 (1943).
2 See NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 55.
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evidence to the effect that anyone had said to the defendant that
he would not be held liable on the note. It was directed that judgment be entered for the plaintiffs. In a dissenting opinion, two of
the justices held that the defendant was an accommodation indorser
for the payees, not for the maker, and that he should not be compelled to pay a note to the persons for whose accommodation he
had indorsed it. The Court of Appeals held that on the record
the trial court was disabled from directing a verdict; that there was
evidence to support the jury's finding, and that the payees could
not recover. By a unanimous order the judgment of the Appellate
Division was reversed, and a new trial granted. Callery v. Lyons,
N. Y. L. J., Feb. 2, 1944, p. 431, col. 1, not officially reported.
At common law as well as under the Negotiable Instruments
Law, the general rule is that an accommodation party is not liable
to an accommodated party, regardless of their apparent relation on
the paper.3 In Higgins v. Ridgway,4 the receiver of a bank sought
to collect on a note which was part of the assets of the bank, and
the maker set up the defense that the note bad been given without
consideration and upon the express promise of the president of the
bank that it would not be enforced. The maker succeeded, the Court
of Appeals ruling that such an agreement was a good defense as
between original parties, and that as between them and others having
notice, parol evidence was admissible. In Whiffler v. Murphy,5 the
payee asked the maker to get an indorsement, and the maker, to
induce the accommodation indorser to sign the note, promised that
the indorser would never be called on for payment. When the
payee sued the indorser, he could not collect, for the court held
that when" the maker made the promise, he must be deemed the agent
of the payee, and that the payee was bound. This was not a bank
case.
The transaction which gave rise to the Ridgway case occurred
before the Negotiable Instruments Law became effective, but, under
the N. I. L. it was the leading case and governed the results in
similar situations, irrespective of the class of plaintiff against whom
the agreement was interposed as a defense. After the financial disturbances of the early 1930's, however, the courts began to inquire
more closely into the circumstances under which such promises were
made, and in 1936 two decisions by the Court of Appeals modified
the rule. In Bay Parkway National Bank v. Shalom, 6 the accommodation party, defending an action brought by the payee bank,
sought to maintain that he had signed the note upon a promise by
the directors of the bank that they would not hold him liable. The
purpose of the transaction was to conceal the true condition of the
bank from the bank examiners. He was not released from his liability,
3
4

8 Am. JUR., Bills and Notes, § 465.
153 N. Y. 130, 47 N. E. 32 (1897).

552 App. Div. 621, 65 N. Y. Supp. 105 (1900).
6270 N. Y. 172, 200 N. E. 685 (1936).
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the Court of Appeals deciding that he should be estopped from setting
up such a defense. A few months later the case of Mt. Vernon Trust
Co. v. Bergoff 7 came before the court. The defendant in that case
had executed a note and delivered it to the bank, receiving simultane6usly a writing exempting her from liability, while the bank had
used the note to conceal a substitution among its assets. The defendant was compelled to pay the note, and in the opinion, Lehman, J.,
stated the modified rule more explicitly. It has become apparent,
he said, that the rule in the Ridgway case might be a cloak for fraud,
and that such agreements would not always be enforceable, at least
where bank examiners and depositors were to be deceived. Then in
1937 the application of the modified rule was extended. LawrenceCedarhurst Bank v. Ruth 8 was a similar action to collect a note
from an accommodation party. There was, however, no suspicion
of concealment or of any but the most praiseworthy intention. The
arrangement provided for the defendant giving a note without consideration, for the purpose of improving the financial position of the
bank, upon the promise that no payment of interest or principal would
be called for unless and until the bank should go into liquidation.
The agreement was specifically approved by the stockholders and
consented to by the bank examiners and by the Comptroller of the
Currency before the bank was reopened after the nationwide closing
in 1933. When the maker was sued by the bank, which had not
gone into liquidation, he sought to be released from the obligation
by relying on the agreement. Public policy, the court held, forbade
that such collateral agreements with banking institutions be deemed
valid, even when everything had been done openly and with no attempt at misrepresentation. In FederalDepositIns. Corporationv.
Lynch 9 the defendant's answer alleged a failure to tender return
of collateral securities which had been pledged when the note was
executed, at the time payment was demanded, and sought to set
up the maker's status as an accommodation party as relieving him
from liability. On the motion of plaintiff, the liquidator of the bank
which had held the note, the answer was struck out as sham and
frivolous, and judgment granted on the pleadings, the opinion pointing out that in cases where a bank was concerned, public policy
entered into the determination.
The result reached in the principal case shows no such disposition to extend the rule to cases between individuals. Here, indeed,
it would seem that the section has received a construction somewhat
more restricted than heretofore, in view of the fact that the court
found in the conduct of the payees, an implied promise not to hold
the accommodation party, even in the absence of any express engagement. Promises were held to be implied by the conduct of the
7272

N. Y. 192, 5 N. E. (2d) 196 (1936).

8 162 Misc. 82, 294 N. Y. Supp. 810 (1937).

946 F. Supp. 466 (D. C. N. Y. 1942).
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parties in George v. Bacon 10 and in Levin v. Schickler," but in each
instance the effect was to compel contribution from an indorser who
would not otherwise have been liable. No example of the release
of an accommodation party on the strength of an implied promise
has been found, prior to the principal case.
The decision would appear to make clear, then, that the general
rule has lost none of its force in cases between individuals, despite
the fact that it will no longer be applied when a bank is a party.
And the limitation of the suspension of the rule in bank cases is
well illustrated in Citizens' First Nat. Bank of Frankfort v. Parkinson.12 In that case the accommodation co-maker's defense was that
the bank had neglected to foreclose on collateral security which the
maker had deposited, although the co-maker had demanded that
the bank do so at a time when the security was ample to pay the
note. While recognizing that by the rule in the Shalom and Bergoff
cases, any agreement by the bank to relieve the accommodation
party would be void, the court nevertheless held that the defendant
13
might invoke the equitable doctrine in Pain v. Packard,
and that
the accommodation party was released by the failure of the bank to
respect his right of exoneration. The principal case will distinguish
the rules of construction to be applied to the accommodation party's
undertaking in cases between individuals from those which govern
when a bank is a party. Once the contract has been construed, the
accommodation party in both types of cases will be accorded all the
benefits of the doctrine of strictissinijuris.
H. L. D.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-CHECK USED By AGENT TO PAY
His OWN DEBT TO PAYEE-RIGHT OF MAKER TO RECOVER FROM

PAYEE.-George Shuman, owner of the capital stock of a country
club, induced plaintiff to give him a check for $775 for the purpose
of paying certain deposits to the utilities people which, if not paid,
would jeopardize negotiation of an important contract and bring about
foreclosure of the country club property. Upon these representations
and to provide for these deposits, the plaintiff gave to Shuman his
check for $775 drawn to the order of defendant herein, who was
the president of the country club. Defendant applied the proceeds
of this check in payment of a personal indebtedness owing to him
from Shuman.' At the close of the trial the complaint was dis10 138 App. Div. 208, 123 N. Y. Supp. 103 (1910).
155 Misc. 372, 374, 279 N. Y. Supp. 491, 493 (1935).
12 178 Misc. 630, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 615 (1942).
'1 13 Johns. 174, 7 Am. Dec. 369 (1816).
11

1 An agent must act within authority granted, and persons dealing with an
agent appointed for a particular purpose, must inquire as to the extent of the
agency. See Miles v. Smith, 141 S. E. 314, 37 Ga. App. 619 (1928).

